The Red Sea Detour, Two and a Half Years Later: Who Actually Paid?
When container lines abandoned the Red Sea in late 2023, the detour around Africa was priced as a temporary emergency. Ship-tracking data through August 2026 says it became the route. We follow the traffic — and the money — to find out who actually paid.
WorldPulse Research·
Suez container transits/day
8.4
-57% vs 2023 · Aug 2026
Cape of Good Hope transits/day
20.3
+244% vs 2023 · Aug 2026
Bab el-Mandeb transits/day
5.4
-72% vs 2023 · Aug 2026
Suez cargo capacity, Mt/day
1.52
-55% vs 2023 · Aug 2026
Germany HICP inflation
2.8%
no freight shock visible · Jul 2026
World trade volume (CPB)
114.2
index, 2021 = 100 · Apr 2026
Transit figures are trailing 90-day averages from IMF PortWatch AIS data; change is measured against the Jan–Oct 2023 pre-crisis baseline. Cards update automatically as new data arrives.
The short answer: the detour never ended, Europe’s consumers never paid, and Egypt paid most of the bill. IMF PortWatch ship-tracking data show that in May–July 2026 container ships transited the Suez Canal about 8 times a day — still 57% below the roughly 20 daily transits of January–October 2023, before the first attacks on commercial shipping in November 2023. Transits past the Cape of Good Hope averaged 20.5 container ships a day over the same window, nearly 3.5 times the 2023 norm. Two and a half years after the crisis began, the emergency route is simply the route.
What did not happen is just as striking. The freight-cost shock that was supposed to reignite European inflation never showed up in consumer prices: Eurostat data show German inflation fell from 2.9% in October 2023 to 2.0% by June 2025, and French inflation from 4.5% to 0.9%, straight through the peak of the diversion. CPB data show world trade volumes rose about 10% over the same period. The rerouting cost was real — it was just absorbed elsewhere: by Egypt’s canal tolls, by Mediterranean transshipment hubs, and briefly by the shippers themselves.
The collapse was almost instantaneous. Container transits through Bab el-Mandeb, the strait that guards the Red Sea’s southern entrance, fell from about 19 ships a day in 2023 to under 6 by early 2024 — and were still averaging 5.4 a day in May–July 2026, a 72% shortfall. What is remarkable is the absence of recovery: the Suez Canal’s 30-day average container count touched its lowest level of the entire crisis (7.6 transits/day) in April 2026, not 2024. Meanwhile the Cape route settled at a new, higher plateau of around 20 container transits a day. For container shipping, this is no longer a disruption — it is the network’s new shape.
Container-ship transits per day, 30-day average
Suez Canal vs Bab el-Mandeb vs Cape of Good Hope. Source: IMF PortWatch (AIS ship tracking), daily.
2. The winners: the Cape route’s toll-free toll booths
A 10–14 day longer voyage needs fuel, crew changes and supplies, and the ports along the Cape route collected what Egypt lost. PortWatch data show Namibia’s container port calls — essentially Walvis Bay, the main bunkering stop on the west-African leg — running about 37% above the 2023 baseline in May–July 2026, after averaging 0.42 calls a day in 2024 and 0.64 in 2026 to date. South Africa’s calls are up about 7.5% over the same window. These are small absolute numbers — the Cape route’s economics favour sailing past, not calling — but they are the clearest port-level winners in the data.
Container port calls, indexed to 2023 average = 100 (90-day average)
Cape-route states vs Egypt. Values above 100 mean more daily port calls than the Jan–Oct 2023 norm. Source: IMF PortWatch.
3. The losers: Egypt’s toll booth and the Mediterranean’s middlemen
Egypt’s loss is not port traffic — PortWatch shows Egyptian container port calls actually up about 8% versus 2023 as of mid-2026. The loss is the canal itself. The Suez Canal’s daily cargo capacity — the tonnage of shipping passing through — fell from about 3.5 million tons a day in November 2023 to roughly 1.6 million by August 2026, a 55% cut that maps directly onto tolls: the Suez Canal Authority reported revenue of $3.99 billion for 2024, down from $10.25 billion in fiscal 2022/23 — a loss of more than $6 billion a year in hard currency, now running into its third year.
The quieter casualties are the Mediterranean’s transshipment hubs, whose business model was relaying Suez-bound boxes onto regional feeders. With Asia–Europe services looping around Africa straight to Northern Europe, Piraeus container calls were about 15% below the 2023 baseline in May–July 2026 and Barcelona about 19% below — a slow bleed that set in through 2024–2025 rather than a single shock. Northern ports were spared: Rotterdam calls are down single digits and Hamburg is flat against 2023.
90-day average container port calls, indexed. Source: IMF PortWatch.
4. Who paid? Not the European consumer
The natural suspects for the detour’s bill were European import prices. Asia–Europe spot container rates roughly tripled between November 2023 and January 2024 as capacity vanished onto the longer route. Yet the pass-through to consumers is invisible in the data: Eurostat’s harmonised indices show German inflation at 2.9% in October 2023, 2.6% in June 2024 and 2.0% in June 2025; French inflation fell from 4.5% to 0.9% over the same window. Ocean freight is simply too small a slice of final goods prices — and the 2024–2025 wave of new container ships, ordered in the pandemic boom, soaked up the extra miles. By 2025 spot rates had fallen back and the “cost” had been converted into distance.
Nor did the goods stop coming. CPB’s world trade monitor shows global trade volumes rising from an index of 103.4 in October 2023 to 114.2 in April 2026; euro-area import volumes dipped about 3% through 2024 — a soft-demand story more than a shipping one — and were back above their pre-crisis level by spring 2026. The RWI/ISL North Range index of container handling at Europe’s big northern ports rose from 104.4 in October 2023 to 118.0 in November 2025. Longer voyages, same boxes.
Euro-area inflation through the crisis (HICP, % YoY)
Germany and France. Source: Eurostat.
Trade volumes kept growing (indices)
CPB world trade & euro-area imports (2021 = 100); RWI/ISL North Range container throughput (seasonally adjusted, through Nov 2025).
5. The ledger: winners and losers, measured in ship calls
The table compares each route or port’s trailing 90-day average of daily container traffic against its January–October 2023 pre-crisis baseline. It recomputes as PortWatch publishes new data.
Container vessels only. “2023 avg” is Jan–Oct 2023, before the first attacks (Nov 19, 2023). Source: IMF PortWatch. Jebel Ali is omitted — its upstream feed broke in March 2026.
The verdict: a tax on Egypt, a rounding error for Europe
The Red Sea diversion is the rare supply shock that reshaped a trade artery without reaching the consumer. As of August 2026 the traffic data show no return to the canal for container shipping — Suez container transits were still 57% below the 2023 norm, and hit a fresh crisis low as recently as April 2026 — yet European trade volumes grew and disinflation proceeded exactly as if the crisis were not happening.
The bill was paid in three places: Egypt, whose canal revenue collapsed from $10.25 billion to under $4 billion a year while its ports stayed busy; the Mediterranean transshipment hubs (Piraeus −15%, Barcelona −19% vs 2023), whose relay business shrank with the artery they served; and, transiently, shippers and carriers, who exchanged a 2024 freight-rate spike for a permanent 3,000-mile detour that the world’s bloated containership fleet turned out to be large enough to absorb. The winners collected in port calls — South Africa, and above all tiny Walvis Bay — and the consumer, who never noticed, collected in silence.
Frequently Asked Questions
Are ships still avoiding the Suez Canal in 2026?
Yes. IMF PortWatch ship-tracking data show container-ship transits through the Suez Canal averaged about 8 per day over May–July 2026, versus roughly 20 per day before the crisis began in November 2023 — a 57% shortfall. The 30-day average actually touched a new low of 7.6 transits per day in April 2026, so for container shipping the diversion was deepening, not fading, two and a half years in.
How much revenue has Egypt lost from the Suez Canal?
The Suez Canal Authority reported revenue of $3.99 billion for calendar 2024, down from $10.25 billion in the 2022/23 fiscal year — a loss of over $6 billion a year in hard currency. PortWatch data show the canal’s daily cargo capacity still running at roughly 1.6 million tons in mid-2026, less than half its pre-crisis 3.5 million tons, so the toll shortfall has persisted into a third year.
Did the Red Sea crisis raise consumer prices in Europe?
Not visibly. Eurostat data show German HICP inflation fell from 2.9% in October 2023 to 2.0% by June 2025, and French inflation from 4.5% to 0.9% over the same period — straight through the peak of the diversion. Spot freight rates on Asia–Europe lanes roughly tripled in early 2024, but ocean freight is a small share of final goods prices, and a glut of newly delivered container ships absorbed the longer route. Disinflation continued on schedule.
Who benefited from ships rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope?
Ports along the Cape route. PortWatch data show South African container port calls up about 7% and Namibian calls (Walvis Bay, a key bunkering stop) up more than 35% versus 2023 in mid-2026. Container lines also profited initially — the effective loss of shipping capacity in 2024 lifted freight rates and earnings — though rates later fell back as new vessels were delivered.
How much longer is the Cape of Good Hope route?
Sailing from Asia to Northern Europe via the Cape of Good Hope instead of the Suez Canal adds roughly 3,000–3,500 nautical miles and 10–14 days per voyage, depending on speed. That extra distance permanently absorbs shipping capacity, which is why the 2024 diversion tightened the container market despite record new-ship deliveries.
Data & methodology. Vessel transits and container port calls are from IMF PortWatch, which derives daily counts from satellite AIS ship-tracking (2019–present), served live from the WorldPulse knowledge graph. The pre-crisis baseline is the January–October 2023 average, ending before the first attacks on commercial shipping on November 19, 2023. Inflation is the Eurostat harmonised index (HICP, year-over-year); trade volumes are from the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis World Trade Monitor and the RWI/ISL Container Throughput Index (North Range). Suez Canal revenue figures are as reported by the Suez Canal Authority (January 2025). Freight-rate movements are described from published Drewry and Freightos index data and are not charted here. Daily series are smoothed with 30- or 90-day trailing averages as noted. Explore the underlying data on the Global Shipping Monitor. This article is analysis, not investment advice.